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Feature Essay
Summer 2011
McClintock, Russell CIVIL WAR SESQUICENTENNIAL: Secession.
Checking the Pulse of Secession Historiography
The winter and spring of 2010-2011 have seen the largest outpouring in
decades of reflections on the Civil War, particularly its origins and opening --
and fittingly so, for sesquicentennials don’t roll around every day. While national
media giants like the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Time magazine
work to convey to the reading public a basic understanding of the war’s causes
and a sense of its most pressing current questions, it seems more appropriate to
the readership of Civil War Book Review to take a brief look at some of the most
important studies of what Henry Adams famously labeled “The Great Secession
Winter" of 1860-1861.
Naturally, any discussion of this sort is idiosyncratic, both in its areas of
focus and its selection of featured works. With regard to the latter, the criteria for
my choices were four. First, I have limited my discussion to published,
book-length studies -- no essays, unpublished dissertations, etc. Second, the
books featured here focus strictly on the Secession Crisis itself; limited by space,
I reluctantly eliminated books on broader topics -- biographies and Southern
state studies, for example -- that include a discussion of the crisis. Third, all have
made important contributions to one or more of the various ongoing debates
surrounding the crisis, and fourth, all are both well-researched and well-written.
This is far from an exhaustive list of the works that meet these requirements, of
course, so I suppose an unofficial fifth standard is the most idiosyncratic: all of
the books here have influenced my own thinking in important ways, given me
great enjoyment, or (quite often) both.
We’ll begin with the South, as most explanations of the war’s origins do.
Surprisingly, although studies of Southern secession are legion, few focus
specifically on the Secession Crisis itself. Even more remarkably, the only book
to look broadly at the South during these crucial months is Dwight Lowell
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Dumond’s The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (1931), which remains an
excellent statement of the pro-secession constitutional argument with an
unexpectedly frank acknowledgement of the centrality of the slave controversy.
An early “revisionist," Dumond spurned the dominant Progressive-school
argument that impersonal economic forces had generated an irrepressible
conflict. To his mind, war could have been avoided, but once stubborn,
short-sighted Northerners rejected compromise, cotton-state leaders had no
choice but to secede. Demonstrating a tendency common to those who study
southern secession, Dumond focuses on the Gulf States; his discussion of the
Upper South is largely confined to a closing chapter in which conservatives in
that region interpreted Lincoln’s inauguration “as a virtual declaration of war"
and followed their sister slave states out of the Union (260). (That Lower South
bias also shaped Dumond’s selections in his invaluable, oft-consulted
primary-source collection, Southern Editorials on Secession, also published in
1931.)
Scholars of secession continued to focus on the Deep South, but by 1974,
when Steven Channing published Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina,
American attitudes toward race and slavery had shifted profoundly, and with
them historians’ views of the war’s causes. Where Dumond offered a rational
defense of southern constitutional principles, Channing painted a vivid portrait of
racial hysteria: coming as it did upon the heels of John Brown’s raid and the
pervasive rumors of slave plots and uprisings that followed, the Republican
victory in 1860 sparked a panicked response among South Carolina whites that
quickly drove the state out of the Union.
William Freehling’s recent opus, Secessionists Triumphant 1854-1861
(2007)-volume 2 of his two-part epic The Road to Disunion-does not dispute
Channing’s emphasis on racial fears, but does complicate his story immensely,
adding (among many other things) considerable emphasis to contingency and
individual agency. The propaganda and political machinations of southern
radicals loom large here as fire-eaters such as Robert Barnwell Rhett and
William Lowndes Yancey consciously played upon the racial and economic fears
of southern whites in order to precipitate the Palmetto State’s unilateral
secession, an act that forced the hands of other, less radical Deep South states. (A
side note: while Freehling’s study does not meet criterion number one, it fulfills
numbers two through five so resoundingly that I couldn’t justify not including it.)
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Charles B. Dew’s brilliant Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession
Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (2001) bridges the gap between
Lower and Upper South, analyzing the arguments made by Deep South
emissaries whose goal was to lure a reluctant Upper South into the new
confederacy. If by the turn of the twenty-first century any question remained
about secession’s stemming from southern anxieties surrounding slavery and the
racial order it established, Dew’s study eradicated it. Deep South commissioners
presented to their Upper South brethren a vision of “the dawning of an
abominable new world in the South," a world in which the destruction of slavery
would usher in racial equality, race war, and racial amalgamation (76).
Those commissioners were but one element of the tug-of-war waged by
secessionists and unionists outside of, among, and within those eight crucial
swing states -- especially Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee -- from
Lincoln’s early November election through the opening shots of war in
mid-April, and beyond. Nobody has explored the delicate, complicated
maneuverings in and over these states more fully or sensitively than Daniel W.
Crofts in his modern classic, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in
the Secession Crisis (1989). Crofts masterfully recounts the “triangular struggle
between the North, the deep South, and the upper South" (xix). In addition to
once more confirming the centrality of slavery to the secession debate, Crofts
also establishes the pivotal role that political parties played in the crisis. Perhaps
more than any other single factor, he concludes, it was the continued existence of
viable two-party competition (which had long since died out farther south) that
enabled unionists to slow secession’s apparently unstoppable momentum in
January and February 1861, containing the movement to the cotton states -- at
least until hostilities at Fort Sumter and, most importantly, Lincoln’s April 15
proclamation sent four more slave states into the new Confederacy.
Crofts not only provides what remains the standard account of events in the
critical Upper South, but he also offers valuable new insight into the northern
rejoinder, particularly in secession-winter congressional negotiations and the
tense deliberations of the fledgling Lincoln administration. Indeed, his work was
originally inspired by David M. Potter’s landmark study, Lincoln and His Party
in the Secession Crisis (1942; repr. with a new preface, 1962; repr. again with a
new introduction by Daniel W. Crofts, 1995). In response to southern-leaning
historians such as Charles Ramsdell who had portrayed Republicans as overtly
hostile to the South, inflexibly opposed to a Union-saving compromise and
needlessly provoking war at Fort Sumter, Potter argued that Republicans were
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not so much hostile as overconfident. Oft-repeated threats of disunion, he pointed
out, had long since conditioned Republicans to dismiss secession as mere bluster,
with the result that they consistently underestimated the danger throughout the
crisis. While Republicans such as Lincoln and conciliatory senator William H.
Seward differed in the extent to which they would be willing to compromise,
Potter believed, they agreed that a latent but deeply rooted southern unionism
would lead to voluntary reconstruction, provided that hostilities could be averted.
The most important rebuttal to Potter came not from Southerners like
Ramsdell but from Milwaukee native Kenneth M. Stampp, whose outstanding
And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis (1950; repr. with a new
preface, 1970) was the first -- and until recently the only -- comprehensive
examination of the northern response to the Secession Crisis. Whereas Potter
recognized the difficulty of resolving slavery-related conflicts but did not see war
as inevitable, Stampp posited an irreconcilable conflict between North and South,
with peaceable separation the only realistic alternative to civil war -- thus, he
concluded, by opposing peaceful secession Northerners actually opted for war.
But unlike most southern-leaning historians who had previously championed this
position, Stampp agreed with Potter that conflicting attitudes toward slavery, not
abstract constitutional disputes, lay at the center of the sectional controversy.
Neither portrayed the North as solidly antislavery -- far from it. Both recognized
significant diversity between Northern Democrats and Republicans and among
different Republican factions, but where Potter sympathized with Republican
moderates (“practical politicians") and described radicals as “ideologues" and
“zealots," Stampp strongly favored the antislavery position and cast moral doubt
upon conciliatory Democrats and Republicans, especially William Seward
(21-22). In his eyes “the compromise movement was superficial and in some
respects fraudulent." (xiii).
Unlike Potter, Stampp believed that, as early as January 1861, Lincoln had
given up on southern unionism and adopted a hard-line stance against
compromise. Regarding Fort Sumter, Stampp rejected both Ramsdell’s argument
that Lincoln deliberately provoked war and Potter’s contention that Lincoln, still
hoping to avoid war, adopted the most peaceable policy available. Rather, he
concluded, the new president realized by late March that unless he were to
acknowledge southern independence, which he would not consider, war was
inevitable; at that point, Lincoln’s chief goal was to ensure that the
commencement of hostilities would take the form of southern, not northern
aggression, and he deliberately maneuvered the Confederates into firing the first
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Almost all studies of the Secession Crisis have focused on North or South or
some city, state, or region within North or South, and most fall into the trap of
paying too little attention to events outside of that area. Daniel Crofts’
exploration of the interplay between Upper South unionists and northern leaders
represents one of the few efforts to bridge the gulf between histories of Southern
secession and of the northern response, which remains the most important gap in
the secession-crisis literature. Numerous books examine particular aspects of the
war’s origins from a national rather than a sectional perspective, generally with
an eye to the long-term development of sectional tensions. While this approach is
invaluable for placing the crisis into its larger historical contexts, such works
have not been balanced by the depth that a discrete study of the crisis itself can
provide. Unfortunately, the two best general studies of the crisis -- Bruce
Catton’s The Coming Fury (1961) and Maury Klein’s Days of Defiance: Sumter,
Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War (1997) -- are popular histories. Both
are extremely well-written, well-researched, and full of thought-provoking
insight; yet they neither reach beyond the high politics of national leaders nor
place that politics within the larger social, cultural, economic, or ideological
frameworks so painstakingly mapped by antebellum historians.
The most recent comprehensive history of the crisis takes precisely the
opposite approach. Reflecting the dominant trend of the profession over the last
two decades, the late Shearer Davis Bowman’s At the Precipice: Americans
North and South during the Secession Crisis (2010) approaches the crisis through
several of its broad cultural contexts, exploring the impact of antebellum notions
of honor and manliness, race and slavery, gender, and religion. Oddly, though,
aside from an overly careful analysis of the disparate constitutional views of
North and South and several biographically centered discussions of the 1840s
and 1850s, Bowman offers little account of the politics of this fundamentally
political crisis and, not coincidentally, no real narrative of the secession winter.
The result is fascinating and rewarding for specialists, but readers with little
previous knowledge of the contours of the crisis will find it tough going.
Nevertheless, it is in the realm of politics that the most exciting work on the
crisis is being done. Jonathan Earle, bringing his impressive insight into
antebellum politics to the election of 1860, will soon release the first broad
account of that pivotal event since 1944. Lawrence T. McDonnell promises to
add a vital layer of depth to our understanding of South Carolina’s secession
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through a grassroots-level probe into popular attitudes and actions in Charleston
during the crisis. Daniel Crofts is in the midst of a long-overdue study of Thomas
Corwin and the slavery-guaranteeing Thirteenth Amendment of 1861, while
Mark Stegmaier has done a staggering amount of research into secession-crisis
newspaper correspondents (and will soon publish a wonderful annotated
collection of young Henry Adams’ crisis-winter reports to the Boston
Advertiser). In addition, a number of historians are currently working on
biographies that should cast much light on the neglected middle, the crisis’s
pro-compromise advocates: Matthew Mason on Edward Everett, Walter Stahr on
William Seward, and I on Stephen Douglas. While a much-needed broad,
comprehensive history of the Secession Crisis may not appear any time soon, our
knowledge and understanding of the crisis continues to expand.
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